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Abstract—JXTA is a set of open protocols that enable the
creation and deployment of peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, allowing
the execution of services in a distributed manner. Being a generic
P2P middleware, it has slowly evolved in order to appeal a
broad set of different applications. Part of this evolution includes
providing basic security capabilities in its protocols in order to
achieve some degree of message privacy and authentication. How-
ever, under some contexts, more advanced security requirements
should be met, such as anonymity. In this work, we propose how
to adapt JXTA messaging so that services may be anonymously
accessed, by taking advantage of JXTA’s idiosyncracies and
capabilities, in a manner that is completely invisible to the
existing protocols. 1
Keywords: peer-to-peer, security, anonymity, JXTA, Java,
onion routing.
I. INTRODUCTION
The adoption of peer-to-peer (P2P) architectures allows the
deployment of resources and services in a self-organizing and
scalable manner. However, just as the popularity of P2P ap-
plications has risen, concerns regarding the degree of security
they can provide have also increased, specially since it is no
longer possible to trust a central server which capitalizes all
security operations. Fortunately, P2P middlewares and appli-
cations are becoming more sensitive to such issue, conscious
that ignoring this it may jeopardize their success.
A security baseline in a P2P system usually includes at
least some degree of privacy, ensuring that the contents of
a message exchange are not revealed to an eavesdropper,
and authentication, guaranteeing the which is the identity of
each endpoint during any message exchange. Both security
services may be deployed in a more or less straightforward
manner using protocols which rely on data encryption and
Message Authentication Codes (MAC) or digital signatures.
An example of such protocol is SSL [1], widely used in
Internet applications to provide secure communications.
As P2P systems evolve and are used in new scenarios, more
advanced security capabilities become important. An example
of them is message anonymity [2], for which privacy is a
necessary but not sufficient requisite. Usually, the concept of
anonymity in P2P networks is associated with situations where
exposure has very strong implications, such as maintaining
the right to free speech or circumventing legal responsibilities
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[3]. However, there are everyday situations which require
anonymity, but even in the worse case scenario, nobody may
end up in jail. Some straightforward examples are a corporate
suggestion box, a small ballot system or a peer evaluation
form. In such scenarios, actual anonymity provides the added
bonus that, by also increasing the users’ trust in the system,
participation is encouraged.
It’s worth remarking that, in each of these scenarios, in
order for messages to remain truly anonymous, it must not
possible for anybody within the P2P network to discover the
message source, no matter what tool is used or its role in
the system. It is not enough that the system just hides source
message information to the users at the upper protocol layers
or such data is managed only by a trusted entity, since it may
still be possible to extract the data using external methods or
simply due to misuse. Low level protocols must actually make
it inaccessible. Even the mere case that users know that some
administrator is still able to expose them may be enough to
stymie participation.
JXTA [4] is an example of a P2P system which already
considers some basic security capabilities, but not anonymity.
The term is briefly mentioned in its specification, but deploys
no actual serious mechanism. In this paper, an anonymity layer
is presented, adapting the current anonymity approaches to the
particular idiosyncracies of JXTA, so any application may send
requests to services without disclosing its identity. The main
contribution of this work is defining the anonymity layer in
such a manner that it may is invisible to accessed services.
Furthermore, the proposal fully realizes the capabilities that
JXTA already possesses, minimizing the amount of required
changes on an existing system in order to integrate anonymous
messaging.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II we provide
a brief summary of the current approaches to anonymity in the
context of P2P applications. Section III describes the chosen
anonymity method and describes how it is adapted to the
idiosyncracies of JXTA services. A security and performance
evaluation of the anonymity service is provided in Section IV.
Section V concludes this paper and outlines further work.
II. CURRENT APPROACHES TO ANONYMITY IN P2P
A thorough review of how anonymity may be attained in
the context of P2P networks is found in [5]. In this survey,
the author categorizes that anonymizing techniques according
to three different approaches: unimessage, split message and
replicated message. In this section, a very brief overview of
these approaches is presented, just providing the main ideas
about how each one works and summarizing their main pros
and cons, so it is possible to assess which is the best approach
for JXTA. It must also be taken into account that even though
the provided application examples are based on each approach,
each one has its own additional subtleties.
A. Unimessage-based approaches
In this approach, an anonymous path is pre-constructed by
the sender before a message is dispatched towards the actual
final destination. The message will be relayed through every
peer in the path before it reaches its final destination. However,
the message is encrypted in such a manner that, at every hop,
each relay peer is only able to learn which is the next hop
where the message must be sent. No peer, apart from the initial
message sender, is able read the whole data path, not even
the final destination. Therefore, every time a peer receives the
message, it cannot be decided whether it has been received
from the original sender or just a former relay. For the same
reason, it is not possible to know whether the next hop is the
actual final destination.
Path encryption is usually performed by adding successive
encryption layers to the original message using public key
cryptography. The public key of each relay is applied at each
layer, so when a relay decrypts the received message with
its private key, the only information found is the identity of
the next hop and the encrypted data that must be forwarded.
The final destination will be the peer which finds the message
(instead of a next hop) after the applying the decryption
process. For that reason, this anonymity approach is also called
Onion Routing [6].
This is the most popular approach to anonymity in P2P
networks, used by systems such as Tor [7] or APFS [8]. This
basic idea is also used in other systems, such as Crowds [9] or
Shortcut [10], albeit with some modifications. The path is not
predetermined by the sender, but probabilistically decided at
each hop. In such approaches, however, only sender anonymity
is achieved. Any relay peer knows the final destination, since
it is transmitted in clear text.
Pros: Medium efficiency, Medium-Low overhead.
Cons: Low reliability.
B. Split message-based approaches
This approach is based on a threshold system [11] and it is
usually used in file publication systems which focus on sender
anonymity. In threshold systems, a secret is split into n parts,
which are distributed between the the users. It is enough that
t users (t < n) collaborate to recover the original secret. This
idea is directly applied to files or messages, which take the
role of the shared secret, distributed among the peers. The
FreeHaven Project [12] is a well known anonymous system
which relies on this approach in an straightforward manner.
Still being based on this approach, other systems exist which
apply a small twist, such as splitting file request queries,
instead of the published file, or encrypting the message and
distributing both the key and the cipher as shares [13]. Shares
are then continually propagated across the network so a single
random peer will be the only one able to recover the query
and issue it on behalf of the original creator.
Pros: High reliability.
Cons: Low efficiency, High overhead.
C. Replicated message-based approaches
This approach relies on using message broadcast or multi-
cast to send the content to everyone, thus hiding which peer
within the network is the actual destination. Messages are
encrypted so only the destination will be able to read the
content, maintaining its privacy. Hordes [14] is an example
in this category.
Pros: High reliability.
Cons: Low efficiency, Very High overhead.
III. ANONYMIZING JXTA MESSAGING
In order to propose an anonymizing mechanism for JXTA
messaging which takes advantage of the middleware’s basic
capabilities, it is important to review the most important
characteristics of its architecture. From this study, it is possible
to create an anonymity layer which nicely integrates with
JXTA without the need to define additional protocols or core
primitives.
A. JXTA Messaging architecture
JXTA differs from other P2P middlewares because it intro-
duces the concept of peer group, one of the main foundations
of its architecture. Usually, P2P environments are conceptual-
ized as a global overlay network without any kind of logical
segmentation or segregation as far as resource availability is
concerned. However, in JXTA, the global overlay network
is segmented into overlapping, hierarchical groups of peers,
which offer a context for accessing services. The concept
of peer groups is very important, since messages can only
be exchanged between peers belonging to the same peer
group. Peers may interact through a set of core services that
groups offer to its members, the most relevant ones being
the Discovery Service, the Membership Service and the Pipe
Service.
The Discovery Service provides a mechanism to conve-
niently publish and distribute resources available within the
peer group. In JXTA, all resources are announced using a
special message named advertisement, a metadata record de-
scribing it and how it can be accessed, which is sent to all other
peer group members. Peers cannot access a resource without
previously retrieving its associated advertisement. The most
important types of advertisements in JXTA are the following
ones:
• Peer Advertisement: Describes a peer and the resources
and services it provides to a peer group, as well as any
available service’s special parameters. It also acts as the
peer’s presence mechanism.
• Peer Group Advertisement: Describes a peer group, its
specific resources and its offered services’ parameters.
• Pipe Advertisement: Describes a pipe, the JXTA core
mechanism for exchanging messages between two ap-
plications or services, providing a simple, unidirectional
and asynchronous communication channel.
Whenever a peer receives the advertisement, it is indexed,
stored in a local cache and assigned an expiration date. When
the expiration date is reached, the advertisement is considered
stagnant and flushed from the cache. Whenever an existing
advertisement is received again, its expiration date is renewed.
Advertisements must be periodically retransmitted in order to
attain permanency or update parameter changes.
The Membership Service allows joining a peer group
and claiming an unique identity within the group’s context.
Through this service, each group member is provided with
a credential, which may be used at any time to authenti-
cate to other group members. Different implementations exist
depending on the chosen way such identity is claimed and
the credential format. In the latest version of JXTA at his
time (2.5), three different implementations exist, but only
one of them actually provides a method to securely provide
such unique identity: the PSE (Personal Security Environment)
Membership Service.
The PSE’s credentials are based on PKIX [15] certificates.
An identity is claimed by being able to properly initialize the
keystore which holds the private key for that certificate. Since
PSE is based on public key cryptography, its credentials are
chosen as a means to provide asymmetric key management
for messaging security services. In fact, every security service
currently provided by JXTA assumes that PSE is used as the
group’s Membership Service. Otherwise, it is not possible to
use them. In order to distribute a peer’s PSE credential to other
group members, it is included in a special service parameter
entry in its Peer Advertisement.
The Pipe Service provides a mechanism to manage JXTA
pipes, which are the basic way to access services. Services
are made available by individual peers by accepting incoming
messages via an input pipe. Every input pipe has an associated
Pipe Advertisement, which is distributed among group mem-
bers by the service provider. Whenever another peer wants
to send a request to the service, such advertisement must be
previously looked up (via the Discovery Service) and retrieved.
Only then, an outbound connection, an output pipe, can be
established via the Pipe Service. A service is considered shut
down whenever its Pipe Advertisement becomes unavailable
for a set period of time.
JXTA messages are sent through pipe connections. Such
messages follow a predefined structure comprised of a set of
name/value pairs, organized as an ordered sequence, the most
recently added element appearing at the end of the message.
As a message passes down each JXTA layer, one or more
named elements may be added to the message (for example,
control data). As a message is processed back up the stack,
each layer will remove these elements.
B. Anonymizing procedure
Form the analysis in sections II and III-A, the chosen
method to be adapted in order to anonymize JXTA messaging
is onion routing, the main reasons being twofold. First of all, it
is the one which keeps a better efficiency while maintaining a
high anonymity degree. Keeping a good efficiency is specially
relevant since message anonymity usually has a very high
impact in system performance, even when compared to other
security services. And secondly, it is based in an architecture
where nodes are completely autonomous and communications
are basically unidirectional, which meshes with the principles
of JXTA messaging (pipes). Additionally, it is also worth
pointing out that its main disadvantage, low reliability, is
not specially detrimental within the JXTA architecture, since
JXTA pipes are already non-reliable by design.
The proposal to provide a JXTA network with anonymizing
capabilities is based in the deployment of an Anonymity Ser-
vice, which takes advantage of all of JXTA’s core capabilities
related to service publication and access. Just like any other
standard JXTA service, the proposed Anonymity Service only
works within the context of a peer group, meaning that only
peers from the same peer group may exchange anonymous
messages. As an additional requirement, such group must
operate under the PSE Membership Service, juts like all of
JXTA’s current security capabilities. Thus, it can be guaranteed
that all group members have a properly initialized JXTA
cryptographic keystore.
Anonymity Service execution in any peer relies on three
distinct procedures: Publication, Message Setup and Message
Processing.
Anonymity Service publication:
Just like any JXTA service, the Anonymity Service’s Pipe
Advertisement must be distributed among other peer members
before it may receive incoming requests. Each peer is respon-
sible for the publication of its own service instance’s pipe and
this procedure must be periodically executed.
In order to maintain the number of advertisements trans-
mitted within the network at a minimum, the service’s Pipe
Advertisement is piggybacked within each peer’s Peer Adver-
tisement, indexed by a hardcoded well-known service iden-
tifier. In fact, this is the same method the PSE Membership
Service employs to readily distribute public key information.
The main advantage of this method is that it is only necessary
to manage a single advertisement type to publish or discover
all data related to the Anonymity Service (service pipe and
peer cryptographic data). Furthermore, the Peer Advertise-
ment’s publication and discovery is already part of JXTA’s
standard procedures, being every peer’s presence mechanism.
Therefore, such advertisement from any group member which
is considered online is always readily available.
A sample Peer Advertisement is shown in Figure 1 (some
encoded data has been shortened for the sake of readability).
The first grey section (a) denotes the Anonymity Service
parameters for that peer, which only consist of its Pipe Adver-
tisement. The second grey section (b) denotes the Memberhsip
Service parameters. For the case of PSE, that’s the peer’s
public key, encapsulated in a PKIX certificate.
Fig. 1. Peer Advertisement supporting the Anonymity Service, containing
(a) Anonymity Service Pipe Advertisement and (b) PSE public key data.
Whenever the Anonymity Service is executed, it is enough
that a new service parameter entry is created at the Peer
Advertisement. When the service is closed, the entry is
removed.
Message Setup:
This procedure is only executed by the peer which actually
wants to send the anonymous message, comprising how the
the anonymous message is initialized to be sent through a set
of anonymizing peer relays.
1) A peer S decides to send a request to any JXTA Service
JXTASvc, being executed at a destination peer D.
Such request is structured as a standard JXTA message,
JXTAMsg, according to the syntax specification ex-
pected by the service.
2) JXTASvc’s Pipe Advertisement, FinalSvcP ipe, is
retrieved using the Discovery Service.
3) Up to this point, the previous steps follow JXTA’s
standard operation, and must be performed whenever a
service is accessed, notwithstanding anonymous messag-
ing. Now, it is decided that the message will be sent to
JXTASvc anonymously.
4) S generates a bit string, RndData, with a randomly
chosen length between 560 and 1120 bytes. The reasons
for this will be explained in IV-A.
5) S generates an OnionCore structure. This structure is a
JXTA message composed by the following name-value
pairs:
• RandomData = RndData
• FinalServicePipe = FinalSvcP ipe
• JXTAMessage = JXTAMsg
6) Using the Discovery Service, S retrieves a set of Peer
Advertisements PAS = Adv1, . . . , Advn, where it is
true that each Advertisement contains an Anonymity
Service parameter entry. The bigger the set, the better
anonymity degree it is achieved, but a value of 3 is
considered good enough [7]. We will refer to each
Advertisement owner as an Onion Peer. It is recom-
mended that PAS contains no duplicates, even though
not strictly necessary. Nevertheless, it should be true that
∀Advi, Advi 6= Advi−1.
7) For each Advertisement Advi in PAS, from n . . . 1,
the following process is iteratively executed. Onioni is
considered the result of each iteration:
a) This iteration’s input, data, is chosen.
i) For the first iteration (i = n) the OnionCore
structure is considered the input.
ii) For the rest of iterations (i = n − 1, . . . , 1),
Advi’s PID field (the peer’s unique identifier) is
retrieved. Then a OnionLayer structure is gen-
erated, which will act as input. This structure
is a JXTA message composed by the following
name-value pairs:
• NextHop = PID
• OnionMessage = Onioni+1
b) The peer’s public key PKi is retrieved from Advi’s
Membership Service definition entry. Under the
context of a peer group which implements the PSE
Membership Service, it is guaranteed that PKi
actually exists.
c) A cryptographic symmetric key SKi is randomly
generated.
d) Enci(data) is created by encrypting the input data
with a secure symmetric key algorithm, using SKi
as the secret key.
e) Enci(key) is created by encrypting SKi with a
key wrapping algorithm, such as the one defined
in [16], using PKi as the key.
f) An OnionMessage structure is generated. This
structure is a JXTA message composed by the
following name-value pairs:
• OnionData = Enci(data)
• WrappedKey = Enci(key)
g) The OnionMessage structure becomes this itera-
tion’s result (Onioni).
8) S looks up the Anonymity Service definition entry in
Adv1 and retrieves the contained Pipe Advertisement.
9) S opens an output pipe using such advertisement, and
directly sends Onion1.
Message Processing:
This procedure describes how an anonymous message is
processed whenever it is received by any peer which has
deployed the Anonymity Service. A summary of the Message
Processing procedure, showing the different structures used
during the onion routing process, is presented in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Onion message processing. Encrypted message fields are denoted in
grey.
1) A peer executing the Anonymity Service receives an
incoming OnionMessage through its input pipe.
2) The content of the WrappedKey field is decrypted
using the peer’s local private key. It is guaranteed that
such key exists, since it was initialized when the peer
joined the group via de PSE Membership Service. The
result is SKi.
3) The content of the OnionData field is decrypted using
SKi. Then, two different things may happen:
a) The decrypted data results in an OnionLayer struc-
ture. This occurs when the message is processed by
an Onion Peer.
i) Its NextHop field is extracted.
ii) The Discovery Service is used to locate a Peer
Advertisement, Adv, containing a PID field
equal to NextHop.
iii) The Anonymity Service definition entry is
looked up in Adv. The contained Pipe Adver-
tisement is retrieved.
iv) The peer waits a random amount of time
RndTime.
v) An output pipe is established, using the Pipe
Advertisement. OnionLayer’s OnionData
field content (an OnionMessage structure) is
sent to the pipe.
b) The decrypted data results in an OnionCore struc-
ture. This is only true for the final destination, D.
i) The original JXTA message, JXTAMSg, is
retrieved from the JXTAMessage field.
ii) The actual final service Pipe Advertise-
ment, FinalSvcP ipe, is retrieved from the
FinalServicePipe field.
iii) The RandomData field is discarded. No pro-
cessing is required.
iv) A local open pipe connection is established
to JXTASvc using its Pipe Advertisement.
It is then used to send JXTAMSg. It must
be noted that, from JXTASvc’s standpoint,
the fact that the message has undergone and
anonymizing process has been completely in-
visible.
An overview of the message onion routing procedure is
detailed in Figure 3. In the figure, to clearly show how data
transformations comes about, message processing is consid-
ered to take place at three distinct layers. The actual data to be
sent is created at the Application layer. That data conversion to
a JXTA Message transmission using service pipes happens at
the JXTA Basic Service Layer. The Anonymity Layer invisibly
takes care of the whole anonymizing process at a lower layer.
IV. ANONYMITY SERVICE EVALUATION
In this section the proposed anonymity layer is evaluated
from two different standpoints. First of all, from a security
point of view, analyzing how it is able to counter typical
attacks to anonymity. Secondly, from a performance angle,
assessing the resulting overhead over standard messaging.
A. Security evaluation
Attacks used to compromise anonymity in P2P networks
can be categorized into those with a local attacker or a global
one. The former is considered a peer group member, only
able to analyze messages it relays. In contrast, the latter is
able to monitor the whole network, being able to intercept
any message and locate the originator and destination of any
intermediate message exchange. The proposed protocol in
this paper only focuses in avoiding local attacks, the most
common ones, since measures to counter global attacks have
a tremendous impact on performance.
The most important existing local attacks are:
• Key retrieval: Any time a peer requests any public key,
in order to create onion layers, it becomes evident that it
is about to send an anonymous message. In this proposal,
key retrieval is performed along Peer Advertisement prop-
agation, a standard JXTA procedure routinely performed
by peers. Thus, it cannot be used to pinpoint suspect
peers.
• Packet size analysis: As an anonymous packet travels
across the netwrok, its size decreases. Since the size of the
anonymity layers and and the final Pipe Advertisement
is known, the last relay can easily spot whether the
next hop is actually the final destination. The included
RandomData avoids this attack, by inserting unknown
fake size equivalent to extra hops (each Onion Layer
amounts to 560 bytes).
• Packet timing: Analyzing message reception dates, it
may also be possible to link messages from a same
source peer which reuses paths, when network latency
Fig. 3. Onion routing procedure.
can be consistently estimated. Waiting a random amount
of time before relaying a message, in step 3.iv of message
processing, disrupts this kind of analysis.
B. Performance evaluation
The incurred overhead in messaging as a result of applying
the anonymity layer may greatly vary depending on the actual
message content and the amount of random data blocks
generated in step 4 of the message setup process. Furthermore,
overhead decreases at each hop, as each layer is processed.
However, it is possible to measure a theoretical worst cas
scenario, considering an empty message (no data content).
A single hop Onion Message incurrs in a 203-378% over-
head over an empty message (640 bytes). This is also the over-
head range of a message at its last hop. Each additional hop
increases the overhead in about 87.5%. Thus, a standandard
3 layer message results in a 378-553% maximum overhead
boundary. The values are quite high, but decrease for messages
with actual content. For example, a 1Kb data message has an
overhead range of 163-151% at its starting point.
It can be concluded that, even though onion routing systems
are classified as “medium ovehead”, from a standard protocol
standpoint, it is quite high nevertheless.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A proposal for an anonymity layer in JXTA has been
presented. Apart from the fact that JXTA currently does not
provide anonymous messaging, the main contributions of the
chosen approach are twofold.
First of all, it fully realizes JXTA’s capabilities, working
only within the context of a standard service’s operation
method. Thus, it has not been necessary to define new proto-
cols or primitives aside from the ones already available in
JXTA. A further advantage of this is that pipe and cryp-
tographic data publication is seamlessly intergraded within
JXTA’s standard presence mechanism.
Secondly, the anonymity layer is almost invisible to the
actual service being accessed. From the service provider’s
standpoint, the original message has been normally received
through its published input pipe. No additional processing
is required from that services’ standpoint. Therefore, the
anonymity layer may be applied to any standard JXTA service.
Further research goes toward extending the anonymity layer
to support more complex JXTA connection types, such as
bidirectional pipes, which basically requires presetting an
onion return path and moving from a stateless service to a
stateful one. Finally, it is also worth studying how to apply
mechanisms that thwart global attackers.
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